With reference to a particular example, we prove that the Decoherent Histories approach to Quantum Mechanics meets logical contradictions unless one drastically limits the allowed decoherent families. Our proof follows a line of reasoning different from the one of anologous criticisms which have been put forward recently; due to its different logical structure, it cannot be rejected on the basis of arguments like those used by Griffiths to claim that the above mentioned criticisms are irrelevant. The proof exhibited here is a particular case of a completely general theorem which has been proved in a recent paper by us.
Introduction
The Decoherent Histories approach of Griffiths [1, 2] , Omnès [3, 4] and Gell-Mann and Hartle [5, 6, 7] has attracted in recent years a lot of attention since it seemed to yield a solution to the conceptual and interpretative problems of standard quantum mechanics (SQM) without requiring relevant changes to the formalism. This feature is not shared by other attempts to work out [8] a quantum theory without observers like hidden variable theories [9, 10] which need additional parameters besides (or in place of) the wave function to characterize the state of an individual physical system, or by the dynamical reduction models [11, 12, 13, 14] which accept that the Schrödinger equation must be modified.
The general structure of the theory can be summarized as follows: let S be a physical system which at the initial time t 0 is associated to the statistical operator W (t 0 ) = W , and let U(t, t ′ ) be the unitary operator describing its evolution. One then chooses n arbitrary times t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t n , and for each of them (let us say t m ) one considers an exhaustive set {P One history is then defined by the sequence of times t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n , and a corresponding sequence of projection operators, each of them taken from the spectral family {P αm m }, (m = 1, 2, ..., n):
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A family of histories is a set whose elements are all hystories having the form (1) , plus all their corse-graining 1 and the null history which associates to each instant the operator 0. For a given family one then considers what is usually denoted as the decoherence functional [5] :
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i.e. iff the decoherence functional vanishes when the two histories His (α) e His (β) do not coincide. When the two histories coincide, the expression D(α, α) is assumed to give the probability that the considered history His (α) is true, i.e. that it describes the properties actually possessed by the physical system under consideration at the considered times. As it should be clear from this presentation, the theory, at its fundamental level, does not attach any particular role either to measurement processes (even though it is perfectly legitimate to build up histories describing the unfolding with time of such processes and the occurrence of their outcomes), or to wave packet reductions, and represents an attempt to get rid of all those features which make fundamentally unsatisfactory the Copenhagen interpretation of SQM.
It must however be mentioned that, recently, various papers have appeared raising serious doubts about the logical consistency of the Decoherent Histories approach [15, 16, 17] . The basic motivation of such investigations was the suspect that the very existence of many families of decoherent histories could conflict with theorems about sets of projection operators on the Hilbert space, in particular with the Kochen and Specker theorem [18] which puts severe limitations to other proposals, like Bohmian mechanics. For what concerns their very structure, the arguments which have been presented up to now against 1 The corse-graining of two histories
. . , (P βn n , t n )} is defined according to: implies history His (β [2] ) . The alleged contradiction derives then from the fact that the two histories His (β [1] ) and His (β [2] ) are contrary, i.e. they correspond to properties which cannot be simoultaneously possessed by the physical system under consideration. The assertion that the truth of His (α) implies both the truth of His (β [1] ) and of His (β [2] ) turns then out to be contradictory.
At first sight this seems a clear-cut argument undermining the whole theory. However, Griffiths [2] called attention on the fact that the previous argument violates the very basic rules of the theory and, consequently, it cannot be considered as conclusive. Actually, even though it is undobtedly true (and Griffiths perfectly agrees on this point) that (if one is arguing within the decoherent family Fam [1] ) the history His (α) implies the history His (β [1] ) , and even though it also true that (if one is arguing within the decoherent family Fam [2] ) the history His (α) implies the history His (β [2] ) , it is nevertheless not true that the two histories His (β [1] ) and His (β [2] ) are simoultaneously true, for the simple reason that there exist no decoherent family to which both histories belong. According to the rules of the theory, the conjunction of histories belonging to incompatible families is not defined and therefore it does not have a truth value. Consequently, for the proponents of the Decoherent Histories, any reasoning, any claim involving both histories is meaningless.
In this letter, without ever taking into account different histories belonging to incompatible families, we will prove that the theory exhibits logical inconsistencies arising from the fact that the same history turns out to be simoultaneously both true and false. This is the crucial aspect marking the radical difference of our argument from all those which appeared in the literature and which renders it immune to criticisms like those used by Griffiths against them. In the next Section we make precise the assumptions of our theorem, in the subsequent one we will exhibit the detailed proof of it.
Four assumptions.
Let us list explicitly and discuss the conceptual status of the four assumption characterizing the Decoherent Histories approach which we will use to prove our theorem. For more details we refer the reader to [19] . a) Decoherent Families and Boolean Algebras. Among the proponents and the supporters of the Decoherent Histories, Omnès [3] , and subsequently Griffiths [1] , have recognized that any family of decoherent histories can be equipped with an algebraic Boolean structure. For simplicity (and also since in what follows we will always make reference to families of this type) let us consider a family of histories characterized by only one time t, and, accordingly, by a unique exhaustive and exclusive set of projection operators {P α }:
In such a case, the logical connectives, the conjunction and the disjunction of two histories and the negation of one history are defined in the following way:
We stress that the fact that any family can be equipped with a Boolean structure plays an essential role within the theory since it guarantees that one can use the rules of classical logic to deal with the histories belonging to a single decoherent family. This in turn implies that the same rules can be used to argue about the physical properties described by the histories, avoinding in this way all difficulties and inconsistencies characterizing quantum logics.
b) Decoherent Histories and truth values. As already stated, it is one of the basic assumptions of the theory that, for a given family satisfying the decoherence condition, the histories belonging to it describe objective properties of the physical system under consideration. Obviously, the theory makes only probabilistic predictions, i.e. it only tells us what is the probability that the considered history be true or false. But it is a fundamental principle of the scheme that the histories of a decoherent family have a precise truth value, even though we do not know which this value is. This assignement of truth values to histories can be expressed formally by an appropriate homomorphism h from the histories of any decoherent family onto the set {0, 1} which must satisfy the conditions making legitimate to resort to classical reasoning when dealing with such histories:
In simpler terms, the homomorphism must preserve the logical operations of conjunction, disjunction and negation. For instance if a history is true the fact that the correspondence h be an homomorphism satisfying the above relations implies that its negation is false; if one history is true and a second history is false, then their conjunction is false, while their disjunction is true. As already remarked, the homomorphic nature of h guarantees that classical logic can be used within a single family of decoherent histories and that the truth values associated to the elements of the boolean algebras (i.e. the histories) obey to classical rules.
c) Identical histories belonging to different families. A fundamental assumptiony of the theory (which we accept, even though we consider it rather problematic) is that any reasoning must be developed within a single family of decoherent histories.
Conclusion deriving from the consideration of histories belonging to decoherent families which are incompatible among themselves are neither true nor false: they are simply devoid of any meaning. One can however raise the following question: when the same history belongs to different decoherent families (which are generally incompatible), should one require that its truth value be the same or can it be assumed to change when one changes the family? We stress that if one accepts that the truth value of the same history depends on the decoherent family to which it is considered to belong, one has to face an extremely embarrassing situation: if we look at the history from the perspective of a given decoherent family, then it may turn out (e.g.) that it is true, i.e. it represents properties objectively possessed by the physical system at the times characterizing the history. But, alternatively, if we consider the same history as belonging to a second decoherent family (different from the previous one) then it may turn out to be false, i.e., it identifies physical properties which are not possessed by the physical system at the considered times. To avoid situations like this one must assume that the truth value of a single history which belongs to different decoherent families is constant, i.e. it cannot depend from the decoherent family one is considering. We will further comment on this crucial point in the conclusions of the paper.
d) How many families of decoherent histories can be considered? One of the main difficulties that the theory had to face since its appearence is the following: are all families of decoherent histories equally legitimate to describe objective properties of physical systems or should one introduce some criterion limiting the number of acceptable families to few, or even to only one of them? The fundamental reasons for which this problem has to be faced are the following. First, the very existence of incompatible decoherent families gives rise to various difficulties of interpretation; as already remarked histories belonging to incompatible families, when considered separately can be assumed to describe correctly the properties of a physical system, while it is forbidden to consider them together. This feature of the theory seems absolutely natural to the supporters of the Decoherent Histories, but it is a source of worries for the rest of the scientific community. Secondly, there are many families (actually the majority of them) which, in spite of the fact that they satisfy the decoherence condition, cannot be endoved by any direct physical meaning: how can then one consider them as representing objective properties of physical systems?. In spite of this difficulties, Griffiths insists in claiming that there are no privileged families. Accordingly, we take (for the moment) the same point of view and we assume that any decoherent family has to be taken into account. Actually, in the proof of our theorem, we will limit our considerations to very few and quite reasonable families, and we will by no means need to resort to the consideration of exotic histories to derive our conclusions.
In the next Section we prove that the just listed four assumptions imply that the Decoherent Histories interpretation of quantum mechanics is logically inconsistent. We will not exhibit the most general derivation of such a conclusion (which has been given in [19] ), but we will prove our theorem with reference to a quite simple example which is sufficient to make clear the crucial lines of our reasoning.
3 An explicit example proving the inconsistency of the Decoherent Histories approach.
Let us focus our attention on a quite simple physical system, i.e., two spin 1/2 particles. We take into account only the spin degrees of freedom and we suppose that the Hamiltonian does not involve the spin variables (so that one can consider it as identically equal to zero -the quantum state of the system does not change with time). Let us consider the spin operators σ
This set of operators has been first considered by Peres [20] and Mermin [21] , to investigate the unavoidable contextuality of any deterministic hidden variable theory. Their argument is quite straightforward: if one assumes that the specification of the hidden variables determine per se which one of the two possible values (+1 and -1) these operators "possess", one gets a contradiction. In fact, since the product of the three commuting (and thus compatible) operators of each line and of the first two columns is the identity operator (which must obviously assume the value 1 for any choice of the hidden variables) while the product of the three commuting operators of the last column equals minus the identity operator, no acceptable assignement of values (+1 and -1) to the nine operators can be made. The way out from this difficulty is also well known: one has to accept the contestual nature of possessed properties, meaning that the truth value of (e.g.) the statement "this observable has the value +1" is not uniquely determined by the complete specification of the system under consideration but it depends on the overall context. In the case under consideration this means that the truth value of the considered statement might (and actually for at least one of them must) depend on the fact that the the considered observable is measured together with the others compatible observables appearing in the same line, or together with the others compatible observables of the column to which it belongs. This fact is considered as puzzling by some people and absolutely natural by others [22] . In any case, the way out does not lead to inconsistencies since some of the operators appearing in the considered line and column do not commute among themselves. It is therefore impossible to perform simoultaneously the two sets of experiments. We would like to stress the crucial fact that the ambiguity about the truth values is here unambiguously associated to actual physically different situations. In the words of the authors of [22] this fact reflects little more than the rather obvious observation that the result of an experiment should depend upon how it is performed! We consider now six families of decoherent histories all of them being one-time histories referring to the same time instant t > t 0 (t 0 being the initial time) and to the same initial state described by a given statistical operator (which we do not need to specify). Being one-time histories the corresponding families are characterized by one exhaustive set {P αm m } of mutually exclusive projection operators and they turn out to be automatically decoherent. Let us characterize them in a precise way:
• Family A. The histories of this family make reference to the properties of the observables σ x . Since such operators commute whith each other one can characterize the maximally fine-grained histories of the family as those associated to the projection operators on their common eigenmanifolds . Let us list the common eigenstates, the corresponding eigenvalues and the associated projection operators and histories:
a) The first eigenstate is:
the associated projection operator is P 1x + 2x + and the history corresponding to it will be denoted as His[1x + 2x + ] . b) The second one is:
whose associated projection operator is P 1x + 2x − and the corresponding history His[1x + 2x − ]. c) The third eigenvalue is:
whose associated projection operator is P 1x − 2x + and the corresponding history His[1x − 2x + ]. d) Finally, the fourth common eigenstate is:
whose associated projection operator is P 1x − 2x − and the corresponding history His[1x
Besides the four histories we have just listed it is useful, for our future purposes, to take into account the two following coarse-grained histories:
Obviously, the first of these histories is associated to the projection operator P 1x + 2x + + P 1x − 2x − . Note that if this history is true, then the property possessed by the system referring to the operator σ
x is the one corresponding to the eigenvalue +1, while, if it is false it is the one corresponding to the eigenvalue -1. The second coarse-grained history we will consider is associated to the projection operator P 1x + 2x − + P 1x − 2x + , and it corresponds to the negation of the history His[(xx) + ].
• Family B. It deals with properties related to the operators σ 
which are associated to the projection operator P 1y + 2y + + P 1y − 2y − and to the eigenvalue +1 of the operator σ 1 y σ 2 y ; and to the projection operator P 1y + 2y − + P 1y − 2y + , corresponding to the negation of the previous history, respectively.
• Family C. The relevant commuting operators are σ a) the first one is:
As usual the associated projection operator is P (xy) + (yx) + (zz) + and the corresponding history His[(xy) + (yx) + (zz) + ] . b) the second one is:
The associated projection operator is P (xy) − (yx) − (zz) + and the corresponding history
c) The third is:
The associated projection operator is P (xy) − (yx) + (zz) − and the corresponding history His[(xy) − (yx) + (zz) − ]. d) Finally, the fourth one is:
The associated projection operator is P (xy) + (yx) − (zz) − and the corresponding history
. We will also consider the following six coarse-grained histories:
According to the above definition we have:
and, obviously, the corresponding relations hold for their images under the homomorphisms.
• Family D. It accomodates the operators σ + ] whose associated projection operator is P 1x + 2y + ; His[1x + 2y − ] whose associated projection operator is P 1x + 2y − ; His[1x − 2y + ] whose associated projection operator is P 1x − 2y + ; and finally history His[1x − 2y − ] whose associated projection operator is P 1x − 2y − . We will also deal with the two following coarse-grained histories:
As it is evident these histories are the same as those ( (8) and (9)) appearing in Family C. In fact they are associated to the projection operators on the eigenmanifolds of the operator σ 1 x σ 2 y corresponding to the eigenvalues +1 and −1, respectively. According to assumption c), since these are the same histories, also their truth values will be the same.
• Family E. It deals with the operators σ , whose associated projection operator is P 1y + 2x + ; His[1y + 2x − ] whose associated projection operator is P 1y + 2x − ; His[1y − 2x + ] whose associated projection operator is P 1y − 2x + ; and finally the history His[1y − 2x − ] whose associated projection operator is P 1y − 2x − . As usual we will also consider two coarse-grained histories:
In this case these two histories coincide with the two coarse-grained histories ( (10) and (11)) belonging to Family C, since they are identified by the same projection operators. Accordingly the corresponding truth values must be the same.
• Family F. This is the last family we will take into account and it is associated to the operators σ 
whose associated projection operator is P (xx) + (yy) − (zz) + and the corresponding history
whose associated projection operator is P (xx) − (yy) + (zz) + and the corresponding history
whose associated projection operator is P (xx) + (yy) + (zz) − and the corresponding history
whose associated projection operator is P (xx) − (yy) − (zz) − and the corresponding history
We will also take into account the six following coarse-grained histories:
coinciding with those appearing in Family A,
coinciding with those appearing in Family B,
which coincide with those appearing in family C. Note that he bove relations imply:
and that, obviously, the corresponding relations hold between their images under the homomorphism. Given these premises we can prove our theorem. Let us consider the history His[1x + 2x + ] belonging to family A, and let us assume that the spin component of particle 1 along the x axis, possesses the value +1 and that the same hold for the spin of particle 2. 
The conclusion of our analysis can be summarized in the following table:
Now we take into account Family B and, without paying any attention to the conclusions we have reached arguing within the previous family, we suppose that particle 1 has its spin pointing along the positive direction of the axis y, while particle 2 has its spin pointing in the negative direction of the same axis. We get then another 
As one should have expected the two truth values are opposite, since the two considered histories are mutually exclusive. In this way we have identified the truth table for the histories of Family C: criticisms of the same kind of those that Griffiths and other have used against the just quoted papers.
The conclusion of this investigation should be obvious: if one wants to entertain the Decoherent Histories point of view one must give up at least one of the previous assumptions. With reference to this problem we point out, first of all, that one cannot give up assumptions a) and b), since they are just those which have motivated and which make interesting the consideration of the Decoherent Histories program, i.e. the fact that they allow to speak of properties objectively possessed and to use classical logic to deal with the histories of a decoherent family. Also assumption c) seems to us impossible to give up. In fact, let us recall the argument concerning the impossibility of considering, within hidden variable theories, the values of the observables of the table at the beginning of Section 3 as uniquely determined by the hidden variables (or equivalently, as objectively possessed). There, we have mentioned that the only way out from this embarrassing situation derives from accepting that the truth values of statements concerning the predictions of the theory about the outcomes of measurements depend from the whole context. In particular, different truth values are always associated to different and incompatible measurement procedures, i.e., to different physical situations. In the case of the Decoherent Histories the situation is radically different. In fact, they do not speak of measurement outcomes but of properties possessed independently of any procedure to test them. Therefore, within such a conceptual framework to make the truth value of a precise history dependent from the family to which it is considered to belong seems logically unacceptable: once more it would amount to betray the very spirit of the theory. The only alternative which remains is to give up assumption d), i.e. to accept that there are too many families of decoherent histories and that one must drastically limit them. This fact does not mark by itself the definitive failure of the program: it simply points out that, in order to be taken seriously, it needs to be enriched by new assumptions apt to identify the family, or the families, which are physically significant. This, however, is not an easy task, and our example throws a precise and disquieting light on the difficulties one will meet in trying to consistently implement such ideas. In fact we can raise the question: which one (or ones) of the six families summarized in the table at the beginning of Section 3 should be discarded? Which criterion could one use which would make some of these families acceptable and would forbid the consideration of the remaining ones, given the fact that they have a quite similar conceptual status and they speak of analogous properties of our system?
